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3 
Summary 
In accordance to the Swedish Income Tax Act (1999:1229) chapter 16 article 1, 
Swedish resident companies have the unlimited right to deduct business expenses, 
including interest expenses regardless of how the corresponding interest income is 
taxed. In 2008 the Swedish Tax Administration presented a research on how 
companies could unlawfully abuse the deductibility by issuing loans to related 
companies. Giving the companies the possibility to lower the overall taxation by 
shifting the taxation of profits in low tax jurisdiction and claiming deduction in 
Sweden. As a consequence Sweden introduced in 2009 limitation of the general right 
to deduct interest expenses on loans between affiliated companies. Ever since its 
introduction, compatibility with EU law has been questioned and in particular the 
freedom of establishment. While the Swedish government and the Supreme 
Administrative Court have stated that they consider the rule to be inline with EU 
laws.  The European Commission has investigated the Swedish rule and concludes 
that it constitutes an obstacle on the freedom of establishment by particularly treating 
cross-border activities disadvantageous, and that the rule goes beyond what is 
necessary to achieve its objective. However the Swedish government does not agree 
with this perception and suggests that the rules are justified and proportionate if 
considered as a violation. The thesis aims to investigate the performance of the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules, by examining whether the rules perform 
as alleged. The analysis in this thesis focus on whether the rules are compatible with 
EU law and under what circumstances the Swedish rule may be accepted as justified 
by the general grounds of public interest. By using the same method as the CJEU 
when investigating if a violation exists, the author comes to the conclusion that an 
indirect discrimination and restriction is created by the Swedish rule. However 
noting that such treatment may be accepted by a combination of several justification 
grounds. One combination of justification grounds, which the thesis highlights, is the 
adding of cohesion of the tax system to the arguments already brought forward by 
the Swedish government. The Swedish government has not considered this 
combination as a possibility in its defence. Nevertheless, practitioners have 
interpreted the justification ground cohesion of the tax system in various ways and 
contrary to the ruling of the CJEU, which has not been consistent in its case law on 
the matter. In the light of the CJEU latest case law regarding the cohesion concept it 
seems that this justification ground may not be permissible. If the Swedish 
government could not defend the cohesion of the tax system coupled with the fact 
that the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has rejected any referrals for 
advance rulings the question remains on whether the Swedish rules could be seen as 
proportionate as it puts the taxpayer in a position of legal uncertainty.  
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Abbreviation list 
       
BEPS   Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Union 
DTC   Double Tax Convention 
EC   European Community 
EU   European Union 
GAAR   General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
MNE   Multi National Enterprises  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development  
SAAR   Special Anti-Avoidance Rules 
SITA   Swedish Income Tax Act 
TFEU Treaty of The Functioning of the European Union
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The creation of interest expenditure is a common strategy used by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) with regard to international tax optimization. Intra-group debt 
financing and the location of external borrowing provides for cost efficient ways in 
which to separate profits from their origin, to send them to wherever it is suitable 
and to take advantage of tax rate differentials worldwide. The OECD, therefore, 
considers the use of interest expenditure to be one of the “key pressure areas” of the 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative.1 As a consequence a variety of 
anti-avoidance rules have emerged by States to tackle the issue. With the common 
objective to limit the possibility of deductions on interest expenses since states want 
to protect their tax base.  
The need for such rules is due to states different tax treatment of debt and equity. 
This lack of neutrality between debt and equity arises since return on equity i.e. 
dividend usually are subjected to some form of tax relief (an exclusion, exemption, 
credit, etc.) in the hands of the recipient and generally without the possibility of 
deduction at the hands of the sender.2 Interest expenses on debt on the other hand are 
deductible for tax purposes and the corresponding interest income is taxed in the 
hands of the recipient. Hence such settings, through an economic point of view, 
creates incentives for debt financing rather than the use of equity for financing with 
regards to investment choices due the favourable treatment of debt.3 Consequently, 
tax planning activities can be achieved both through internal and external 
borrowings.4 One simple example involves MNEs setting up a finance operation in a 
low-tax jurisdiction to fund other group companies undertakings. The effect is that 
the expenses are deductible against the taxable profits of the high-taxed companies, 
while corresponding interest revenue is taxed favourably or not taxed at all at the 
hand of the recipient, thus resulting in a reduction of the total tax burden for the 
group.5 The Swedish Tax Authorities highlighted this issue in the so-called 
“Industrivärden målen”.6 However, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the 
Tax Administrations claim to disallow deduction of interest expenses paid to 
affiliated companies when the corresponding interest income was not taxed or taxed 
with a low rate. The court stated that the Tax Authorities arguments in favour of the 
use of General Anti Avoidance Rules (GAAR) to tackle the issue were not 
                                                      
1 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, p. 48 (OECD 2013), International 
Organizations Documentation, IBFD. 
2 The Parent-Subsidiary directive aims to abolish withholding taxes on payments of dividend 
between associated companies and preventing double taxation within group companies. See: 
Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States 
(recast).  
3 OECD (2014), Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Action 4: Interest Deduction And Other 
Financial Payments, OECD Publishing, p. 6.  
4 Jan Vleggeert: ‘Interest Deduction Based on the Allocation of Worldwide Debt’ (feb. 2014), 
p. 103, Bulletin for International Taxation, IBFD. 
5 This type of tax planning through interest deductions was considered to create a significant 
amount of tax revenues losses; Proposition 2008/09:65, Sänkt bolagsskatt och vissa andra 
skatteåtgärder för företag, 28 October 2008, p. 31. 
6 See: RÅ 2007 ref. 84, case nr. 1774-04; RÅ 2007 ref. 85, case nr. 6699-04, 6701-04 and 
6703-04.  
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applicable on such transactions.7 The outcome left the Swedish Tax Authorities with 
little chance to combat such transactions and subsequently Sweden introduced a 
Specific Anti Avoidance Rule (SAAR) in the form of national interest deduction 
limitation rules to prevent tax base erosion through abusive structures.8 Sweden’s 
choice to not levy any withholding tax on outbound interest payments ignites the 
base erosion problem further.9 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has in various cases dealt with 
different types of rules intended to limit interest deduction.10 Hence, the CJEU case 
law has created a framework for the scope of such rules, which states need to 
consider in order for the rules not to be in conflict with the Treaty freedoms. 
However, the court’s case law also provides for under what circumstances it can be 
justified to violate the Treaty Freedoms, the so-called rule of reason doctrine created 
by the CJEUs jurisprudence.11 The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules have 
not been referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on whether the rule 
discriminates or restricts the Treaty freedoms. Moreover, the Swedish rules are not 
similar to other interest deduction limitation rules or thin capitalization rules. 
However, questions have been raised whether the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules are compatible with the fundamental freedoms of EU Law.12 The 
Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, surprisingly and without any reference for a 
preliminary ruling, declared in 2012 that the rules did not constitute a discrimination 
or restriction on the freedom of establishment.13  
Nevertheless, one year later the Swedish rules became subject to investigation by the 
European Commission. The 26 of November 2014 the Commission, in its letter of 
formal notice to the Swedish Government, stated that they consider the Swedish 
rules incompatible with the freedom of establishment protected by Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, in its respond, the Swedish 
Government is of a contrary opinion than the Commission, suggesting that the rules 
are compatible with EU law. Leaving the Commission with no choice but to proceed 
with a respond in a reasoned opinion to the Swedish Government where Sweden is 
invited to within a prescribed time period to change the rules so that they are 
compatible with EU law. If not changed, the Commission is likely to take Sweden to 
the CJEU in an infringement proceeding.  
                                                      
7 Ibid.  
8 Proposition. 2008/09:65, See also: the amendments made through Regeringens, 
Budgetproposition 2012/13:1.  
9 See e.g. Brokelind, C. (2015) Comment on the formal investigation against Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules. Highlights & Insights in European Taxation, no. 5 p. 13; and 
Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 6a. 
10 C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst, [2002] ECR I-11779; C-350/11, Argenta Spaarbank; C-
524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, [2007] ECR I-02107; and C-
282/12, Itelcar. 
11 See e.g. C-337/08, X Holding BV, [2010] ECR I-01215, para. 20; C‑446/04, Test Claimants 
in the FII Group Litigation, [2006] ECR I‑11753, para. 167. C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] ECR 
I-04165, para. 37. 
12 Ohlsson, F., Dags för HFD att begära ett förhandsavgörande om 
ränteavdragsbegränsningarna?, SkatteNytt, 2014, p. 659 (pp. 652-659); Hilling, M., Är det 
möjligt att utforma EU-förenliga skatteflyktsregler? En analys med särskilt fokus på EU-
domstolens proportionalitetsbedömning, SvSkT, 2012, p. 826 (pp. 814–824). 
13 See HFD 2011 ref. 90; HFD 2012 ref. 6; and HFD 2012 not. 3, Case no. 6062-11 & 6063-
11. 
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1.2 Aim 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are scrutinised in this paper. The aim 
is to analyse whether the rules are compatible with EU law. This will be done, 
firstly, through analysing if the claims made by the European Commissions that the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are incompatible with EU law are valid 
and secondly whether Sweden’s arguments could justify such measures. The paper 
also aims at examining whether other arguments could have been lifted which would 
have brought clarity to the issue.     
The questions that are to be answered in order to fulfil the aim is (i) whether a 
discrimination or restriction exists; (ii) whether it could be justified by the 
imperative reasons of overriding public interest and (iii) whether such rules respect 
the principle of proportionality.  
1.3 Method and material 
The method used in this paper has its origin in the thesis aim and the questions it is 
sett out to answer. As the aim is to test the compatibility of the national legislation 
with the fundamental freedoms by considering the arguments brought forward by the 
European Commission and the Swedish government. Therefore the method of 
interpretation is based on a EU law method, which the CJEU follows when assessing 
whether a national provision is in line with the fundamental freedoms. Michael Lang 
et al. discuss this methodology as a scheme14, where questions need to be asked and 
answered before the investigation can take steps forward. By first analysing the 
Swedish provisions on interest deduction limitations, clearance could be found 
regarding the scope of the rules. Literature, articles and case law will clarify the 
functioning and effects of the Swedish rules. This analysis will answer the first two 
questions of the scheme, namely how the subject is affected and how a cross-border 
situation is affected. The next step in the scheme is to establish which freedom is 
affected. This will be done by analysing the fundamental freedoms provided for by 
the TFEU15, case law and literature to establish its scope and then applying the 
empirical findings from the analyses done of the Swedish rules to determine which 
freedom or freedoms are affected. The scheme then goes on to the comparable test, 
which the CJEU does in order to find out how the difference in treatment appears. 
By scrutinizing the case law and literature, conclusions can be drawn on whether the 
rule appears to be discriminatory or restrictive. With these steps the first question of 
this thesis can be answered. When established whether a discrimination or restriction 
appears, the scheme goes on to figure out whether such rules could be justified by 
the rule of reason doctrine created by the CJEU. As this is a case law base principle 
it is natural to find guidance through the courts case law and from doctrinal debates 
made by academics to get an understanding of the purpose and scope of the 
justifications. At this point in the analysis assumptions may be made to answer the 
second question. These assumptions will be built on the argumentation and empirical 
findings made by the analyses throughout the thesis. One cannot guarantee that these 
are correct assumptions as it finally is the CJEU who will evaluate the circumstances 
to reach a decision. The final step in the scheme answers the last question on 
whether national rules may be perceived as proportionate. Such examination is 
totally dependent on the findings in the analysis and by comparing the findings with 
the reasoning made by the CJEU in its case law. In order to reach independent 
conclusions on the final question the literature and case law will be used to 
                                                      
14 Lang, M., et al, Introduction to European Tax Law on Direct Taxation, (2013) Third 
Edition, Linde Verlag: Wien, p. 47. 
15 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (consolidated version), OJ C83 
(2010), EU Law, IBFD. 
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understand how the proportionality test is performed and to draw parallels with the 
Swedish rules by reasoning equally as the CJEU has done in similar circumstances.  
In order to fulfil the aim of the thesis the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules 
will be examined by a rule-oriented approach, which intends to identify the problems 
and difficulties in the application of the rule through its technical meaning.16 As 
mentioned above this thesis intends not to provide a final answer. It rather intends to 
further clarify the underlying process and criterions searched for by the CJEU to 
identifying arguments and evaluating results, thereby emphasizing both reliable 
statements and contradictory considerations. This is done by an inductive approach, 
which means that the analysis starts from the existing case law to create a 
understanding of the decisions made by CJEU and the empirical findings will then 
be the basis for the arguments.17 The analysis according to a EU legal research 
method based on the methodological scheme seeks to clarify how the Swedish rules 
should be interpreted, which is a de lege ferenda research method.18  
1.4 Delimitation 
This thesis is limited to the treatment of the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rule and its application in a cross-border transaction within the European Union. The 
OECD BEPS project and particular actions 4, Limit base erosion via interest 
deductions and other financial payments, and to some extent action 2, Neutralise the 
effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements, could influence the future direction of 
treatment of intra-group debt financing structures. However this projects has not 
been subject for examination. This is because of the stage at where this work has 
reached so far. However the realised discussion drafts on action 4 has presented 
certain methods to limit base erosion through interest deductions limitation rules, it 
is in the author’s opinion that such measures will not have the intended effect until 
all or a majority of the Member States ratifies such rules. Other sorts of limitation 
rules such as Thin Capitalization, Neutralization of debt and equity rules and interest 
deduction limitation rules with in the European Union is not analysed or compared 
as the thesis is intended to form a basis on how the Swedish rules may be perceived 
by the CJEU. Furthermore, the thesis deals only with the relevant parts of EU law in 
relation to direct taxation. The work does not give a complete account of EU tax law 
but is limited to cover only the relevant treaty provisions regarding the freedom of 
movement affected by the Swedish rules. Therefore the thesis does not take account 
of the Interest & Royalties Directive or any particular negotiated Double Tax 
Conventions agreements. 
1.5 Outline 
As the method used to analyse whether an infringement exist is the same as the one 
CJEU uses in its case law the logic and framework of the outline are already 
established. In chapter 2 the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule is to be 
scrutinized together with case law and doctrinal debates to create an understanding 
on how it may affect the fundamental freedoms. This will be followed by an analysis 
of the scope of the fundamental freedoms in chapter 3, where it will be examined 
how the Swedish rule affects the freedoms of movement and by what manner the 
                                                      
16 Westberg, Avhandlingsskrivande och val av forskningsansats - en idé om rättsvetenskaplig 
öppenhet, Lund, 1992, s. 421 f.f. 
17 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law, (2013), Routledge 
Publishing: London and New York, p. 56.  
18 Makkonen, T., Nordic Cosmopolitanism – Essays in International Law for Martti 
Koskenniemi, Brill Academic Publisher, 2003, p. 256.   
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rules may be a violation. The empirical findings of the examination at this point 
gives the reader an understanding of the effects the fundamental freedoms have on 
national law, the link between direct taxation and the internal market. With that 
knowledge the thesis continues to analyse how and for what reasons a violation of 
the fundamental freedoms has been justified by the CJEU. To reach the aim of this 
thesis those findings will be applied to the effects of the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules, creating the basis for arguments in the last chapter on whether the 
Swedish rules treats taxpayers in a equal or unequal manner justified by the CJEU.     
2 Swedish Interest Limitation - Regime 
2.1 Introduction 
Sweden’s introduction of interest deduction limitation rule came into force as of 1 
January 2009, as a reaction to the failure to limit deduction on interest expenses.19 
The rule was intended to target excessive debt financing, tax base erosion and 
abusive arrangements through intercompany debt financing of shareholdings.20 After 
criticism and monitoring of the 2009 rules by the Tax Administration the rules 
underwent amendments in 2013 and is currently in force. In order to fulfil the aim of 
this thesis this paper will only focus on the rule as it stands at the time of the writing 
of the thesis.  
2.2 Scope of application – To Whom Does is Apply?      
All corporate taxpayers may deduct expenses related to acquiring and maintaining 
income, including interest expenses according to the general rule found in Chapter 
16, Swedish Income Tax Act (SITA).21 As the 2013 interest deduction limitation rule 
is derogation from the main rule, served as a specific anti-avoidance rule, the rule 
does not apply to all company loans. The first article provides for the scope of the 
interest deduction limitation rule. It states that the interest deduction limitation rule is 
applicable to affiliated companies22 and further explains what shall be regarded as 
affiliated company as intended by the rule.23 There are two alternative definitions 
explained on when a company is considered affiliated. The affiliated criterion is 
fulfilled when one of the companies directly or indirectly, through shareholding or in 
another way has substantial influence over the other company or, when the 
companies are mainly under same management.24  
The paragraph has been criticised for its lack of clarity, in particular the wording 
substantial influence as it does not have a precise threshold stated in the law.25 In the 
                                                      
19 Proposition 2008/09:65, p. 30; Brokelind, C. (2015) Comment on the formal investigation 
against Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. Highlights & Insights in European 
Taxation, no. 5 pp.13-17 
20 Proposition 2008/09:65, p. 31; Skatteverkets promemoria, 2008-06-23, dnr 131 348803-
08/113, p. 5 and 15.    
21 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 16:1 §.  
22 The Swedish term is ”intressegemenskap”.  
23 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10a §. para. 1. 
24 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10a §. 
25 See for example Jilkén, D. and Jilkén, C., Väsentligt inflytande och under huvudsak 
gemensam ledning – luddiga begrepp på drift?, Svensk Skattetidning, 2013, nr. 6/7, p. 498 
and 516 (pp. 492-517); and Jilkén, C., Skatteverkets dialogsvar om ränteavdrag, Svensk 
Skattetidning, 2014, nr. 3, p. 193 (pp. 187-213). 
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legislative process it is mentioned that shareholdings just below 50% may be 
considered and that the term substantial influence is a customary term, used in 
several other tax related contexts in Swedish tax law.26 In the preparatory works to 
the SITA the legislator has mentioned thresholds of 40% ownership could be 
sufficient in order to achieve substantial influence status, indicating that a 40% 
ownership might be enough for companies to be considered as affiliated.27 However 
the Swedish Tax Authorities have suggested that they could consider shareholdings 
way below 40%, where the assessment will not solely be based on the level of 
shareholding, but rather collectively with other contractual agreements and number 
of parties involved will be considered.28 The lack of clarity on when companies have 
substantial influence in other companies creates legal uncertainty and sets the 
taxpayer in a problematic position to evaluate the taxable outcome of its activities. 
Nevertheless, companies are also regarded as affiliated if they are mainly under the 
same management according to the alternative definition. The paragraph does not 
provide for a clear definition or threshold when companies are regarded as mainly 
under same management but in the preparatory works of the legislation it has been 
clarified that it is a quantitative requirement of at least 75 %.29 Such level of 
threshold is intended to prevent circumvention of the status by splitting up the 
shareholdings on a number of companies, e.g. subsidiaries, that are under common 
control by a parent company or where unrelated parties are commonly controlled by 
a third party.30 The legislator points out the importance of actual influence and not 
formal influence, which applies to both definitions on affiliated companies. What is 
included in the term company in the interest deduction limitation rule is explained by 
the second paragraph of the article. It covers legal persons and registered 
partnerships.31 The SITA chapter 2 Article 2 states that terms used in SITA also 
includes its corresponding foreign phenomenon, which excludes other company 
forms that accordingly to Swedish law are not considered a legal person.32 
2.3 The Main Rule & Back-to-Back Loans 
The core principle of the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule lies within the 
second article. Pursuant to the main rule, deduction of interest expenses are not 
allowed if the debt relates to loans between affiliated companies.33 However, in order 
for the main rule to not limit interest deductions on commercially justified debt 
financings between affiliated companies, the main rule is backed up by derogations 
from the main rule and derogations from the derogation. The main rule covers all 
interest expenses related to debts between affiliated companies, which is a deviation 
from the principle of net income taxation found in SITA chapter 16 Article 1.  
In the third paragraph the so-called back-to-back loans are regulated. The rules are 
intended to limit the deductibility of interest expenses incurred by a third party debt, 
to the extent where the debt is represented by a claim, that one of the companies in 
the affiliation has on the third-party company, or to a company belonging to the 
                                                      
26 Proposition 2012/13:1, p. 239. 
27 Proposition 1999/2000:2 part 1 p. 502 ff; Borg, E. P., Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229) – 
Chapter 24:10a§ Kommentar, Karnov database (2015-09-23).  
28 Skatteverkets ställningstagande 2013-02-25, Några frågor vid tillämpningen av 
ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gällande väsentligt inflytande, undantaget från 10 % -
regeln och ventilen, dnr. 131-117306-13/11. 
29 Proposition 2008/09:65 p. 68, 72 and 87; and Proposition 2012/13:1 p. 217. 
30 Proposition 2008/09:65 p. 46. 
31 Handelsbolag is the Swedish term; Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10a §. 
para. 2. 
32 See also SITA, chapter 2:3-4§§ and Chapter 5:2§ for more companies covered.  
33 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10b §. 
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same affiliation as the third party and the debt concerns an acquisition of shares.34 
This provision was introduced to prevent circumvention of the general rule.35 There 
are exceptions to this rule, however they apply when the conditions for deductibility 
of interest expenses are applicable, found in the derogations to the interest deduction 
limitation rule, discussed below.36 The term “shares” has the same definition as 
defined in chapter 48 article 2 SITA, including participation certificates, equity 
certificates, convertibles, redeemable- and sales rights with respect to shares and 
share derivatives etc.37 The Supreme Administrative Court has acknowledged that 
the term shall have a vide definition including also newly issued shares.38  
2.4 The 10%-rule 
As mentioned above, there are two derogations where intra-group deduction of 
interest expenses is accepted. One of the exceptions is the ‘ten-percent’ rule.39 This 
exception requires a minimum level of taxation, where such level is determined by a 
hypothetical-test in order to see whether the interest income corresponding to the 
interest expense would have been taxed by at least 10% in the hands of the beneficial 
recipient.40 When conducting the hypothetical-test the laws of the State in which the 
company within the affiliation that actually is the beneficial owner of the income is 
resident shall be regarded.41 Other income, losses or deductible expenses from its 
normal activities shall not be included when assessing whether the interest income 
has been taxed.  
How the Swedish interpretation of beneficial owner ought to be is rather unclear due 
to the fact of the frequent appearance of the ‘beneficial owner’ in the Swedish 
internal law and that it is interpreted inconsistent.42 In the interest deduction 
limitation rule the meaning of the word should be interpreted in its international 
meaning accordingly to the legislator, however, there is no uniform international 
interpretation. The purpose of the beneficial owner concepts in this context is to 
hinder deduction of interest expenses when the receiver of the income only acts as a 
conduit company or intermediary located in a jurisdiction where the interest income 
is taxed by at least 10% but is not the real beneficiary who can enjoy the income.43   
The exception rule also contains an alternative approach aimed at industries that is 
not taxed conventionally, such as, pension funds or assurance companies.44 The 
alternative approach allows deduction on interest expenses if the beneficial owner of 
the interest income within the association is subjected to Swedish yield tax or a 
                                                      
34 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10c §. 
35 Proposition 2008/09:65 s. 54 f. and 84 f; Proposition 2012/13:1 s. 265 ff. 
36 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10d and f §§. 
37 Borg, E. P., Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229) – Chapter 24:10c§ Kommentar, Karnov 
database (2015-09-23). 
38 HFD 2011 ref. 90 V. 
39 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10d §. 
40 Proposition 2008/09:65, p. 59. 
41 Proposition 2008/09:65, p. 59-60, 85-86; Proposition 2012/13:1, p. 216-217. 
42 Chapter 6a paragraph 4, SITA based on Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 - on 
a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between 
associated companies of different Member States; Kupongskattelag (1970:624) 2§; Swedish 
tax treaties based on OECD-MC, article 10-12; and Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 
24:10d-f §§.   
43 Proposition 2008/09:65, p. 61 and Proposition 2012/13:1 p. 254; Brokelind, C. (2015) 
Comment on the formal investigation against Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. 
Highlights & Insights in European Taxation, no. 5 pp.13-17 
44 Proposition 2012/13:1 p. 244.  
12 
comparable tax.45 It is also required that the interest rate accruing on the debt during 
the fiscal year, on an average, have not exceeded 250% of the standard state bond 
interest rate provided for during the calendar year preceding the fiscal year.46  
2.4.1 A Derogation From The Derogation 
The legislator found it necessary, after having observed an adjustment to the 10% 
rule by companies, to implement a limitation on deductibility of interest expenses 
even if the corresponding interest income is taxed with at least 10%.47 Deduction of 
interest expenses is not accepted if the main reason for the debt financing is for the 
association to sustain a significant tax benefit.48 This paragraph contains two 
cumulative thresholds that shall not be infringed if one seeks to deduct interest 
expenses, which is an attempt by the Swedish legislator to hinder abusive 
arrangements and base erosion. The first threshold is the requirement of a 10% 
taxation of the recipient of the interest income and the second threshold is the so-
called ‘motive test’, where the taxpayer has to prove that the main reason for the 
debt financing is not to receive a substantial tax benefit. This threshold is set at 75%, 
meaning that a 24% business motivated transaction will not be accepted.49 However, 
when determining the motive of the debt financing, both the lenders and the 
borrowers perspective shall be investigated and all relevant circumstances are to be 
considered. Criticism was directed towards this paragraph already before it was 
implemented.50 Both the ‘ten-percent’ rule and the 75% threshold have been 
criticised for being too difficult to assess and will require excessive resources to 
construct accounting records due to the different accounting standard used in 
different states when reporting the ‘hypothetical-test’.51 One may ask whether such 
thresholds coupled with the passing on of the burden of proof are compatible with 
EU-Law.  
There have been several cases submitted for advanced rulings by the Swedish Board 
of Advance Rulings where taxation exceeding 10% have been established. In all 
cases the Board has denied deduction, claiming that the taxpayer has not been able to 
show that the underlying transactions are not mainly tax driven.52 The rule 
automatically presumes that taxation lower then 10% is tax avoidance and if the 
taxation is over 10%, but not at a level of 22% (The Swedish Corporate Tax Rate), 
the Board has in all cases challenged the taxpayers claim by suggesting that the 
taxpayer has not been able to show that the main reason for such transaction was to 
receive a substantial tax benefit.53 Some of the Boards Advance Rulings where 
appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which dismissed the appeal by 
claiming that the Swedish Interest deduction limitation rule required a 
comprehensive investigation, not suitable for an advanced ruling.54 The 10% rule has 
been criticised by various academic authors for being unclear and causing legal 
                                                      
45 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10d §. para. 2, p. 1. 
46 Ibid, para. 2, p. 2. 
47 Proposition 2012/13:1, p. 247, 251. 
48 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10d §. para. 3. 
49 Proposition 2012/13:1, p. 251. 
50 Proposition 2008/09:65, 28 October 2008, p. 57 ff.; Tivéus, U., Regeringen föreslår 
skärpta ränteavdragsbegränsningsregler, SkatteNytt, 2012, p. 261-262 (pp. 258-265). 
51 Proposition 2008/09:65, p. 58 
52 Skatterättsnämnden förhandsavgöranden: Board of Advance Rulings, 2014-04-29, dnr 
80/13/D; and 2014-07-10, dnr 92-13/D. 
53 European Commission, letter of formal notice – Violation Number 2013/4206, Annex: C 
(2014) 8699 final, p. 5.  
54 HFD Case nr. 2674-14; and HFD Case nr. 4217-14. 
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uncertainty.55 The Tax Administration and the legislator have tried to clarify their 
view and pointed out where guidance could be acquired. The Swedish Tax 
Administration did so by releasing a statement56 in 2013, containing their view of the 
interpretation.57 In the preparatory work of the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rule the legislator suggests that guidance on the interpretation can be obtained from 
how to apply the second derogation concerning mainly business motivated debt 
financings.58    
In addition, the European Commission has raised concerns on how the Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rule is treating non-resident affiliations in an unequal 
manner as resident affiliations. The reason behind this treatment is that Swedish 
groups can through the group-participation rules transfer debts or capital, without 
ever or in rare cases be questioned whether the transaction is mainly tax motivated or 
business motivated due to taxation way above 10% will occur.59 
2.5 Released Pressure  – When Business Motivated 
In order for the rules to not disallow deduction of interest expenses on commercial 
justified debt financings between affiliated companies, active in low-taxed 
jurisdictions, the interest deduction limitation rule contains a Business Purpose test.60 
The so-called ‘Ventilen’ in Swedish is intended to allow deductions on interest 
expenses where the main reason for the debt financing is business motivated. 
Regardless on whether the interest income corresponding to the interest expense has 
been taxed at a level above 10%, if the beneficial owner of the interest income is 
resident within the EEA or located in a state with which Sweden has a DTC with, 
which is not limited to certain incomes only.61 In similarity as the exception to the 
10% rule mentioned above, the business purpose test also includes the threshold of 
75% through the requirement that the purpose of the debt is mainly business 
motivated. The legislator motivates the requirement because the rule is applicable 
when the interest income is taxed at a low level and argues that the rule should be 
used restrictively because of the great tax advantage it creates for the taxpayer.62 
This requirement, again, puts pressure on the taxpayer to convince the Tax 
Administrator that the threshold is achieved. Upon assessing whether the debt 
financing is mainly business motivated, particular attention should be given on 
whether contribution of equity could have been used instead by the lender or any 
other of the companies included in the affiliation that have significant influence in 
                                                      
55 See e.g: Carneborn, C., Nya tioprocentsregeln – En ren beräkningsregel?, Skattenytt, 
2013, p. 46- 51; Fredrik, O., Även solen har sina fläckar EU-rättsliga frågetecken kring flera 
svenska skatteregler. Skattenytt, 2013, p. 102.  
56 Ställningstagande in Swedish, which is not a legal source and therefore not a binding 
document.    
57 Swedish Tax Agency, Skatteverkets ställningstaganden – Några frågor vid tillämpningen 
av ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gällande väsentligt inflytande, undantaget från 10 %-
regeln och ventilen, dnr 131-117306-13/111, 25 February 2013. 
58 Proposition 2012/13: 1 p. 253 
59 The corporate tax rate is 22% in Sweden, Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 
65:10§; European Commission, letter of formal notice – Violation Number 2013/4206, 
Annex: C (2014) 8699 final, p. 4-5. 
60 Proposition 2012/13:1 p. 255 and Proposition 2008/09:65 p. 67 and 87. 
61 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10e §. 
62 Proposition 2012/13:1 p. 256. 
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the lending company.63 This requirement is a codification of the Swedish case law 
rendered by the Supreme Administrative Court.64  
The Swedish Government has been reluctant to describe all relevant circumstances 
that need to be considered when assessing the main purpose test. Stating that such 
evaluation is to be made on all relevant circumstances of the individual cases.65 
However, the legislator in the preparatory work has discussed circumstances that 
indicate that the debt financing is not mainly business motivated. The legislator 
explains that tax reasons are not to be considered business reason when applying the 
test, even if it is legitimate for businesses to rearrange activities to obtain tax 
optimization.66 Additionally, when assessing the main purpose test, considerations 
shall be taken on whether the lender has received funding in order to be able to 
provide a loan to the barrower or if the corresponding claim is transferred to another 
company in the affiliation.67 The legislator has in the preparatory work mentioned 
that business motivated cash-pooling arrangements should not be targeted, but has 
not recognized that such models look differently in different industries and 
investment choices.  
Existing case law, further upholds such views by claiming that the business purpose 
test shall not equate organisational reasons with business reason, by not considering 
organisational reasons as valid motive for engaging in certain debt financing 
structures.68 Such establishment causes confusion and uncertainty on how to use 
different type of holding structures, financing structures but also acquisition of other 
companies which is followed by an internal acquisition in order to incorporate the 
company in the affiliation. Nevertheless as mentioned above third party debt that is 
followed by an internal debt financing or the other way around, the so-called back-
to-back loans are also covered by the 10%-rule and the business purpose test.69 
2.6 Final Remarks  
More then six years after Sweden introduced the interest deduction limitation rule, 
which experienced amendments in 2013, concerns have been raised regarding the 
compatibility of the rules with EU law.70 Both, academics and the European 
Commission have questioned whether the Swedish rules discriminate or creates a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment.71 Should the rule infringe EU law, 
question remains on whether they would be justified by the rule of reason doctrine. 
The Supreme Administrative Court established in 2012 that the rules where not 
discriminatory by examining whether the debt financing was business motivated and 
therefore there was no need for any assessment on justification grounds, or if the 
rules are proportional.72 However, the European Commission has compared the 
effects of the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule with existing CJEU case 
                                                      
63 This is a codification of the developed case law: HFD 2011 ref. 90, Case nr 7649-09, see: 
Proposition 2012/13:1, p. 217-218, 263. 
64 HFD 2011 ref. 90 I-V. 
65 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 257. 
66 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 257. 
67 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 258 f. 
68 HFD 2011 ref. 90 I; HFD 2012 not. 3, and HFD 2012 not. 23. 
69 Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Chapter 24:10f § p.1. 
70 Samuelson, L., ’HFD Avvaktar EU-Domstolen om Ränteavdragsbegränsnings’ Svensk 
Skattetidning, no. 6/7, 2011, p. 558; Hilling, M., ’Är Det Möjligt Att Utforma EU-Förenliga 
Skatteflyktsregler?’, Svensk Skattetidning, no. 10, 2012, p. 823; Proposition 2008/09:65, p. 
69-70  
71 Ibid; TFEU, Art. 49 Freedom of Establishment; European Commission, letter of formal 
notice – Violation Number 2013/4206, Annex: C (2014) 8699 final, p. 6. 
72 See HFD 2011 ref. 90; HFD 2012 ref. 6, HFD 2012 not. 3, Case no. 6062-11 & 6063-11. 
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law, together with the cases referred to the Boards for advance rulings as bases for 
its arguments.73 Obviously, the Swedish Tax Authorities have in all twenty advance 
rulings, up to date, regarding interest deductions where there is a foreign receiver 
denied the claim of deduction when the taxation was less then 22%. All of those 
twenty claims where the taxation have exceeded the 10% threshold the authority has 
claimed that the main reason for debt was for the group to obtain a substantial tax 
benefit.74 On the remaining claims, where the conditions have been such that 
taxation of the recipient of the interest income been below 10%, the Tax Authorities 
have claimed that the applicant have not been able to show that the debt was mainly 
business motivated.75 Questions have been raised whether such shifting of the burden 
of proof on the taxpayer is proportionate when the taxation is below 10%.76  
The European Commission has brought the Swedish rules under scrutiny, by 
claiming the rule infringing the freedom on establishment on reasons explained 
above. The European Commission does not deny that justified reasons for rejecting 
interest deduction are applicable, they rather argues that the Swedish rules, by 
demanding a 75% threshold which automatically denies debt financings that may not 
be wholly artificial goes beyond what is necessary to achieve its objectives.77 The 
Swedish government has defended its rules and informed the European Commission 
that they are not going to change their rules on these accusations. This leaves the 
European Commission with no more option than proceeding with a reasoned opinion 
where Sweden within a time certain time-frame must apply or risk a referral to the 
CJEU. In the meantime the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has rejected any 
requests on advance rulings regarding the interest deduction limitation rules.78 
3 The Fundamental Freedoms  
3.1 Introduction 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rule is an attempt to counter base erosion 
and abusive tax practices targeting cross-border debt financings between affiliated 
companies. Even if the rule does not explicitly mention that it is primary targeting 
cross-border debts, the legislators clearly stated such intentions in in the preparatory 
work.79 Coupled with the effects of the rule, it has somewhat become obvious that so 
is the case.80 According to the TFEU, when rules target cross-border activities it is 
important that the rule treat EU nationals in the same situation equally.81 In order to 
protect and sustain an effective internal market, direct or indirect discrimination on 
individuals or entities based on nationality is forbidden unless the treaty states 
                                                      
73 European Commission, letter of formal notice – Violation Number 2013/4206, Annex: C 
(2014) 8699 final, p. 5. 
74 Ibid p. 5. 
75 Ibid, p. 5. 
76 Ibid, p. 8. 
77 Ibid, p. 7 f.f. 
78 See Case no. 2674-14. 
79 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 272. 
80 This assumption is made by the Commission, backed with statistics on the outcome of the 
Swedish Board of Advance Rulings regarding the interest deduction limitation rule. For 
further detail see: European Commission, letter of formal notice – violation number 
2013/4206, Annex: C (2014) 8699 final, p. 5.  
81 The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 18-25. 
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otherwise.82 However, the scope of the Treaty’s prohibition of discrimination based 
on nationality only applies when comparing a national from one Member State with 
one from another Member State in a cross-border activity and not to one purely 
internal to Member States.83 The European internal market is protected by the 
fundamental freedoms, covering four freedoms. These are, the free movement of 
gods, the free movement of persons, the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital. Within the free movement of persons there are more freedoms 
i.e. the freedom of establishment, the free movement of workers and the free 
movement of citizenship.84 When Member States introduce tax rules they must be 
compatible with these freedoms by not performing in discriminatory or restrictive 
way.  
However, the CJEU has through its decisions created justification grounds for 
infringement of the fundamental freedoms based on the need to protect the general 
grounds of public interest, the so-called Rule of Reason doctrine.85 The impact of the 
fundamental freedoms on the national rule varies depending on which freedom it 
concerns.86 When evaluating whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule 
are discriminatory or restrictive, which falls within the area of direct taxation, one 
must first decide which freedom or freedoms are applicable.   
3.2 Effected Freedoms 
The free movement of goods does not play a significant role for direct tax purposes 
compared to its effect on indirect taxation.87 Moreover, this freedom is not affected 
by the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule, since the rules only apply to 
interest expenses between affiliated companies. By the same token, the free 
movement of workers and the free movement of citizenship are not affected. To start 
with, the freedom to provide service in article 56 TFEU provides for the right of 
nationals of one Member State to provide services in another Member State, without 
the need to establish a domicile there. The freedom in question precludes Member 
States from establishing national rules that hampers the possibilities of providing 
services between Member States in contrast to providing it purely within one 
Member State.88 As a result the freedom also covers the persons whom the service 
are intended to benefit from it and without the need for the service provider to be 
established in that stat. This includes situations where only the service itself crosses 
                                                      
82 The TFEU provides for certain grounds that allows for discriminatory national rules. These 
grounds are Public Policy, Public Security and Public health, which in the area of direct 
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83 Helminen, M., EU Tax Law – Direct Taxation, (2013), Published by IBFD, e-book, 
Chapter 2, p. 1.   
84 Helminen. M, EU Tax Law – Direct Taxation, (2013), Published by IBFD, e-book, Chapter 
2, p 6. See also: TFEU Articles 21, 34, 45, 49, 56 and 63. 
85 It originated from Case: Cassis Dijon 120/78, Reewe-Zentral, [1979] ECR 649, para. 8, 
and has developed through the years. See also: Lang, M., et al, Introduction to European Tax 
Law on Direct Taxation, (2013) Third Edition, Linde Verlag: Wien, p. 71.    
86 Helminen, M., EU Tax Law – Direct Taxation, (2013), Published by IBFD, e-book, 
Chapter 2, p 6. See also: Smit, D. D., The relationship between the free movement of capital 
and the other EC Treaty freedoms in third country relationships in the field of direct 
taxation: a question of exclusivity, parallelism or causality?, EC Tax Review, 2007, Issue 6, 
p. 257. 
87 Terra, B. & Wattel, P. J., European Tax Law, 5th Edition, Kluwer Law, 2008, p. 52. 
88 C-281/06, Hans-Dieter and Hedwig Jundt v Finanzamt Offenburg, [2007] ECR I-0000, 
para. 52; C-136/00, Rolf Dieter Danner, [2002] ECR I-8147, para. 29; C-118/96, Jessica 
Safir v Skattemyndigheten, [1998] ECR I-1897, para. 23; and C-290/04, FKP Scorpio 
Konzertproduktionen GmbH v Finanzamt Bergisch, [2006] ECR I-09461, para. 31. 
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the border.89 The CJEU has in its case law mentioned that the providing of loans 
could include in the application of providing services within the framework of 
Article 56 TFEU.90  
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rule therefore could fall within the 
freedom to provide services for the above-mentioned reasons. However, article 57 
TFEU explicitly mentions that the free movement to provide service is to apply 
when none of the Freedoms of goods, persons and capital is applicable. 
Consequently, one must judge the character of the service to establish which 
freedom is affected. Services are normally characterised by a temporary activity. If 
the service requests great infrastructure in other Member State it could be a sign that 
other freedom is also affected.91 This view has been upheld by CJEU in cases where 
the court has chosen to only examine ether the free movement of capital or 
establishment when the free movement of services also been applicable.92 In the 
Sodemare SA case the CJEU made the distinction between the freedom of 
establishment and free movement of service based on the duration of the activity.93 
The questions that remain are whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule 
also falls within the scope the freedom of establishment and the freedom of capital 
and if so, do any of them prevail over the other?  
The freedom of establishment ensures EU nationals the right to conduct businesses 
in other Member States by setting up of agencies, subsidiaries or branches. It also 
includes the right to take up and pursue undertakings as self-employed and to set up 
and manage activities, within the laws and conditions applying to the Member States 
own nationals, where the establishment is located.94 An establishment within this 
freedom is characterized by CJEU as “actual pursuit of an economic activity through 
a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period”.95 The CJEU 
has in further case law clarified that the pursuit of economic activity requires a profit 
making activity on a stable and continuous basis and that “indefinite period” is 
determined by factors such as regularity, duration, continuity or periodicity.96 
Accordingly to the above mentioned the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule, 
which targets debts between affiliated companies in a cross-border situation, falls 
within the scope of the freedom of establishment.  
The CJEU has in various cases tested, with regards to national interest deduction 
limitation rules, whether a restriction appears on the freedom of establishment.97 
Where the rational lies in whether “national provisions which apply to holdings by 
                                                      
89 C-76/05, Herbert Schwarz und Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch, [2007] 
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222/95, Parodi, [1997] ECR I-03899, para.17; and C-452/04, Fidium Finanz, [2006] ECR I-
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34; C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, [2007], ECR I-02107, para. 
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nationals of Member State concerned in the capital of a company established in 
another Member State, giving them definite influence on the company’s decisions 
and allowing them to determine its activities, come within the substantive scope of 
the provisions of the EC Treaty on freedom of establishment”98. Such national rules 
could ultimately affect companies to establish in the Member State.     
Article 63 of the TFEU provides that the Free Movement of Capital prohibits all 
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and third countries. 
In contrast to the other fundamental freedoms, this freedom affects transactions 
beyond the borders of the Internal Market.99 The TFEU provision on the free 
movement of capital does not define the expression movement of capital. Through 
the CJEU case law, the nomenclature found in Annex I to the Directive 88/361100 has 
been recognized as an indicative source for the determination of the expression, 
which however it is not an exhaustive source.101 Normally, the term capital 
movement is to be understood as a transfer of capital that is not restricted by a 
transaction falling under free movement of goods or services, a cross-border stream 
of value in form of monetary capital or other material or immaterial assets from one 
Member State to another.102          
In order to determine whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule could 
affect the free movement of capital one must bear in mind that the rules target debt 
financing between affiliated companies. The Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rule requires certain form of control in the decision-making of the companies 
involved. Nevertheless, whether the term movement of capital could impact on such 
control in other companies, the nomenclatures points I and III coupled with the 
explanatory notes set out in Annex I in the directive implies that direct investment in 
the participation of an undertaking by means of a shareholding or acquisition of 
securities on the capital market establishes capital movement within the meaning of 
Article 56 EC (Now Article 63 TFEU).103 It is further pointed out in the directives 
explanatory notes that direct investments is characterised, particularly, by the 
possibility of participating effectively in the management of a company or in its 
control. Consequently, the Swedish Interest deduction limitation rule could fall 
within the scope of the free movement of capital.  
The second question to answer is whether one fundamental freedom prevails over 
the other or whether they should be tested simultaneously? The TFEU does not 
establish any order of priority between the freedoms. However, it is mentioned that 
the freedom to provide services is supplementing the free movement of goods, 
persons and capital in article 57 TFEU. The first time the CJEU examined the 
question of prevailing freedom, in the context of direct taxation, was in Cadbury 
Schweppes.104 In that case the taxpayer raised that three freedoms where affected, 
the freedom- to provide services, capital and establishment. The CJEU held, 
according to settled case law that national provisions applying to holdings by 
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residents of one Member State of the company’s capital established in another 
Member State, which gives them definite influence over the companies decision 
comes within the substantive scope of the freedom of establishment.105  
However, the court did not reject that the other freedoms where applicable, it rather 
stated that if the examined provisions had “restrictive effects on the free movement 
of services and the free movement of capital, such effects are an unavoidable 
consequence of any restriction on freedom of establishment and do not justify, in any 
event, an independent examination of that legislation in the light of Articles 49 EC 
and 56 EC” (Now Article 56 and 63 TFEU).106 The CJEU has in numerous cases 
argued in the same manner as in Cadbury Schweppes, when searching for the 
prevailing freedom.107 However, an independent or parallel examination of the 
freedom of capital, when applicable, would have a significant impact on any third 
country situation, since it would mean that national from third countries would 
indirectly have access to EU internal movement rights. This has however not been 
the case. The CJEU has in third country circumstances still searched for the 
prevailing freedom and stated that any restriction on other freedoms are an 
unavoidable consequence of the restriction on the predominant freedom.108  
At first glance at the CJEU case law one might think that the prevailing freedom 
with regards to the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules would be the freedom 
of establishment, because of the criterion of substantial influence that is required by 
the interest deduction limitation rule in order to establish an affiliation.109 However, 
as showed in chapter two in this paper, the Swedish government and specially the 
Tax Administration require a very low threshold of shareholding in order to consider 
a company to have substantial influence.110 In both, Itelcar and Test Claimants in the 
FII Group Litigation, the CJEU chose the free movement of capital as the prevailing 
freedom.111 The court concluded in both these cases that when national provision 
does not necessitate a definite influence, the free movement of capital should 
prevail.112 When does the court consider that definite influence exists? A straight 
answer does not exist, it has not been established an exact threshold by the CJEU 
where they consider that the criterion is fulfilled.  
However, the Court has elaborated in numerous cases a spectrum of different types 
of control. Where a 25% shareholding has been considered as sufficient to allow 
influence on the company’s management and control and enforces conditions, which 
ensures that the shareholding is not solely a financial investment.113 This was the 
case in the Scheunemann case, which regarded shareholdings by a German national 
in a third country company. The CJEU stated that the freedom of establishment was 
applicable and therefore the German national could not rely on the scope of the 
freedom, because it is not applicable with regards to third country.114 The German 
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internal provision concerning inheritance taxation required a 25% shareholding in 
order to obtain a tax benefit. It is important to recognize that the court did not 
consider the 25% as sufficient and crucial in its assessment when determining the 
applicable freedom. The German national owned 100% of the shares in the third 
country company, which influenced the court in its judgement to choose the freedom 
of establishment as the prevailing freedom and the free movement of capital as an 
unavoidable consequence of the freedom of establishment.115 It is questionable, 
whether the court had chosen the freedom of establishment if the shareholding by the 
German national would have only been 25%. In its assessment the court does not 
mention that the 25% shareholding creates definite influence, it rather defined a type 
of control, which is similar to the one found in the nomenclature of Annex I to the 
Directive 88/361, outlining the free movement of capital.116 Moreover, the CJEU has 
in its settled-case law determined that inheritance taxation in principle falls within 
the scope of Article 63 TFEU.117 The CJEU made an important statement in Test 
Claimants Litigation118 case that effects which freedom is applicable with regards to 
the Swedish rules. The Court mentions that when national rules at issue is to apply, 
both, to shareholdings which could create definite influence on decision making and 
on the basis of a shareholding not conferring such influence the court can with 
respects to the facts of the case at issue determine which freedom is applicable.119  
Consequently, as the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule is to apply both when 
definite influence is at hand and where lower levels of control exists, it could imply 
that both the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital could be 
applicable as predominant freedom when establishing whether the Swedish national 
rules violate the principles protecting the Internal Market. Moreover, the CJEU has 
made it clear in its case law that in order to establish whether a national rule falls 
within the scope of one or other of the freedoms of movement, the aim of the 
legislation in question must be taken into consideration.120 Nevertheless, the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court and the legislator in its preparatory work of the 
interest deduction limitation rule are of the opinion that the freedom of establishment 
is the applicable freedom.121 This is also the view of the European Commission in its 
letter of formal notice to the Swedish Government, where they also based the 
compatibility analyses on that specific freedom.122 It is in the author’s view not clear 
why the Commission has restricted its claim of restrictive measures to only the 
freedom of establishment and not also to the free movement of capital. 
3.3 What is the Violation?   
Direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States. The sovereignty of 
states gives them the right to establish their desired tax base.123 There are only a few 
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areas within the jurisdiction of direct taxation, applying to Member States, which is 
harmonized through EU directives.124 However Member States are still obliged to 
make sure that national legislation does not violate EU regulations, in particular the 
TFEU fundamental freedoms creating the internal market with regards to direct 
taxation. The general Article 18 of the TFEU prohibits any discrimination based on 
the grounds of nationality. This articles scope is rather limited with regards to direct 
taxation in comparison to the fundamental freedoms.125 Any discrimination, direct or 
indirect, based on nationality is also prohibited with respect to the fundamental 
freedom, as provided in the general rule found in Article 18 TFEU.126 An indirect 
discrimination will occur when a national provision treats a resident and a non-
residents in comparable situation differently on bases of other criterions then 
nationality, a covert discrimination, which finally amounts to discrimination based 
on nationality.127  
The TFEU also forbids any kind of restrictions on the fundamental freedoms. The 
CJEU has established in its case law that all measures that prohibit, impedes or 
render less attractive the exercise of the basic freedoms are considered as 
restrictions.128 A restriction has a greater scope than the application of the general 
article of discrimination based on nationality. A restriction could both occur from tax 
treatments, which render less attractive circumstances, but also from procedural or 
administrative requirements.129 It is not only the host state that is prohibited from 
applying legislation that is restrictive or discriminatory, this also applies to the home 
state.130 The equal treatment of activities and persons rises from the general principle 
of equality in EU Law and thereby it is also relevant for the fundamental 
freedoms.131 Moreover, the general principle of equal treatment commands that 
comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situation must not 
be treated by the same manner, except for where such treatment is objectively 
justified. The CJEU has developed this method when examining whether a 
discrimination or restriction exists, through the so-called comparison test.132 Such 
exam has been done through comparing the factual cross-border situation with a 
hypothetical national situation or by comparing the factual cross-border activity with 
a hypothetical cross-border activity. This analysis is the so-called vertical and 
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horizontal comparison.133 The CJEU has then looked at whether different sets of 
rules would apply to comparable situations or the same rules would apply to non-
comparable situation.134 However, it has been stated by the CJEU that resident and 
non-resident taxpayers are, as a rule, not in a comparable situation. Consequently, to 
determine whether resident and non-resident taxpayer could be comparable the court 
has examined the aim and purpose of the national tax provision in order to determine 
whether there is any objective differences between resident and non-residents.135   
3.3.1 The Swedish Rules a Discrimination or Restriction 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules might be discriminatory or restrictive 
when applied in cross-border transaction where the recipient is taxed by at least 10 
% coupled with the requirement that the main reason for such transaction has not 
been to receive a substantial tax benefit. This also includes the requirements in the 
business motive test found in chapter 24:10e §, which necessitates that the main 
reason for the debt financing is business motivated when taxation is below 10%. The 
rules do not directly discriminate on the bases of nationality.136 It is rather based on 
the difference in the level of taxation between countries. However, it is argued by the 
European Commission that the rules indirectly discriminate foreign group companies 
in comparison with Swedish groups, due to the fact that the Swedish group 
contribution rules only apply to Swedish groups located in Sweden. With the effect 
that the interest deduction limitation rules only apply to foreign groups. This 
difference in treatment of resident groups and group companies which are located in 
more then one Member State would also restrict companies choice of 
establishment.137 The Commissions argument is valid in the sense that the interest 
deductions limitation rules does not apply to Swedish group because the taxation 
will never be below 22%.138 However, the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule 
does, as explained in chapter 2, not only apply to group companies, but also to 
affiliated companies. In order to be recognized as a group company according to 
SITA, it is required a shareholding of over 90%.139 This type of definite influence 
goes beyond what is necessary in turn to be recognized as affiliated company 
accordingly to the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. This means that the 
European Commission has narrowed its claim of discrimination or restriction to a 
stricter type of control covered by the freedom establishment.  
According to the author of this paper this might have been unnecessary. One may 
question whether the Commission paid attention to the aim and purpose of the rule 
when establishing their claim. However, the Swedish government claims that a 
Swedish group with right to give group contribution is not in a comparable situation 
with a group of companies being located in more the one Member State, which can 
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not give group contributions with regards to the aim and purpose of the Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rules. They also claim that the CJEU has made it clear 
that it is justified to treat internal groups different then to external groups when such 
rules make it possible for MNE to choose in which jurisdiction they will be taxed.140 
In order to determine whether discrimination exists, one must decide, bearing in 
mind the aim and purpose of the rule, whether an internal loan between a Swedish 
group is comparable with a cross-border loan form one group member to another and 
whether two independent cross-boarder loans are comparable. The CJEU did this 
comparison in the Oy AA case and came to the conclusion that a cross-border group 
is comparable with a pure internal group and the difference in treatment causes both 
a restriction and is an indirect discrimination.141 However, the court did not compare 
the transaction with another cross-border transaction in the Oy AA case. This is not a 
surprise, when glancing at the established case law.142 If the rules were to be 
scrutinized through the perception that its purpose is intended to limit the 
deductibility of interest expenses within group companies, the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules would by a strict vertical comparison be regarded as a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment according to existing case law.143  
By applying the horizontal comparison test to also two independent cross-border 
debt financings within group companies with regards to the aim and purpose of the 
rules would not change the fact that debt financing within group companies are 
comparable.144 This would mean that the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules 
would have a restrictive effect on companies who wish to establish in other Member 
States if such states do not have the same tax rate as Sweden or above.145 This is due 
to the fact that the deductibility of the Swedish rules are conditional upon the 
taxation level of the state where the beneficial recipient is located.146 It has been 
established that the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules could have an indirect 
discriminatory and restrictive effect on comparable transactions, which is not in line 
with the principle of equal treatment entrenched to the fundamental freedoms. The 
analysis will go on to examine whether the restriction and indirect discrimination 
caused by the Swedish rules could be justified.   
3.4 The Rule of Reason 
It is provided for certain justification grounds in the TFEU for when a national rule 
might be discriminatory. These justifications are public health, public security and 
public policy.147 Such justification grounds have been put forwarded to the CJEU to 
justify discriminatory national laws but has never been accepted as justification by 
the Court in the area of direct taxation.148 It was in 1979 that the CJEU decided in 
Cassis de Dijon that a restriction could be justified by the overriding reason of public 
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interest.149 The rule of reason has gradually grown out of the CJEU case law as 
Member States put forward claims justifying national measures that restrict the 
freedom of movement in the name of the imperative requirement of overriding 
public interest.150 Through the courts case law it has emerged areas that might be 
accepted as justification in the name of public interest, which are safeguarding the 
balance allocation of taxing rights, the principle of fiscal territoriality, cohesion of 
the tax system, prevent abusive practices and fraud, neutralization in the other state 
and effectiveness of fiscal supervision.151 Many authors have discussed these topics 
and even suggested that they could be categorized as closely linked or in related 
groups of justification.152 However, the following analysis will examine which of 
them might serve as justification for the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules 
and which could not according to the rule of reason doctrine created by the CJEU.        
3.4.1 Justification Grounds not Applicable on the Swedish Rules 
If one of the arguments, presented above, that might justify a discrimination or 
restriction is not accepted it might still be justified if the other state involved is 
willing to provide for a tax credit that neutralizes the negative effects causing the 
discrimination or restriction.153 However, Sweden does not have such provisions in 
its DTC that gives the taxpayer the possibility to utilize the denied interest costs in 
Sweden by the other contracting state.154 Moreover, the denial of deduction is not a 
tax that could be neutralized by the other state using the credit method.155 Further 
argument put forward to the CJEU justifying restrictive or discriminatory national 
provisions on the freedoms of movement in the name of public interest by Member 
States is the need to safeguard the effectiveness of fiscal supervision.156 The CJEU 
has accepted that Member States apply measures that can ascertain the taxpayer’s 
claim clearly and precisely.157 However, the court has stressed that such measures 
must not be disproportionate burdensome and is appropriate when other less strict 
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measures are not available.158 As previous mentioned the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules objective is to prevent tax base erosion as a specific anti-abuse 
provision and not to safeguard an effective fiscal supervision. Consequently, it is not 
a claimable justification. 
3.4.2 Territoriality Principle 
The principle of territoriality is of great importance, as it creates the boundaries for 
Member States on its power to allocate taxing rights and is also the principle, which 
generates constrains on the principle of equality protecting the fundamental 
freedoms from discrimination or restrictions.159 Countries usually tax persons 
resident on its territory on its worldwide income and non-resident on its income 
derived from activities allocated to its territory. For such reasons it is argued that 
resident taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers, in general, are not in a comparable 
situation and therefore a difference in treatment could be justified.160 However, the 
comparability test must be assessed in the light of legislation at hand, as explained 
under section 3.3.1 and whether objective differences exists between the situation of 
residents and non-residents.161 Moreover, academics have argued that this approach 
is not feasible, because the non-comparability is rather a mere consequent of the 
reduced territorial boundaries of tax jurisdiction and whether such limitation could 
justify effects on other items, such as deductions, credits or tax rates.162 As a result 
Member States must, by preserving the concept of tax neutrality, show an actual 
relationship between the territorial boundaries in its taxing rights and the subsequent 
disadvantage for the taxpayer. The justification of different treatment in the light of 
the territorial principle has only been tested by the CJEU in relation to the possibility 
deny deductions of not utilized foreign losses of persons subjected to limited liability 
in cases where the foreign profits is not taxed in the state where the deduction is 
claimed or in accordance with the Schumacker doctrine, which is of no relevance for 
the Swedish rules examined in this paper.163  
The question whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules could be 
justified by the government through the territoriality principle as a restrictive or 
discriminatory measure in the name of the public interest is unlikely. Since Sweden 
does not tax outbound interest payments nor does it tax the profits of affiliated 
companies located in other Member States through DTC.164 However, this does not 
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mean that the principle is of no importance in the pursuit to determine whether the 
Swedish rules could be justified. This is due to the fact that the principle of 
territoriality is entrenched with the two justification grounds, balance allocation of 
taxing powers and the coherence of the tax system, included in the scope of the 
public interest which will be presented bellow.165 The author of this paper agrees 
with the bold statement made by Wolfgang Schön that, “Territoriality is not in itself 
a “public interest” that justifies unequal treatment in specific cross-border situations. 
It is merely a constraint to the taxing powers of a Member State”.166 
3.4.3 Balance Allocation of Taxing Rights  
As mentioned earlier in this paper the intended purpose of the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules is to combat base erosion and tax avoidance. However, it 
is settled case law that the CJEU refuses to accept unequal treatment by Member 
States based on the argument that restrictions are necessary to combat tax base 
erosion.167 Although the court has accepted certain measures as justifications in the 
public interest that protects Member States territorial taxing rights, which has 
budgetary effects. One is the need to safeguard the balance allocation of taxing 
powers (balance allocation) and the other one is the need to safeguard the cohesion 
of the tax system, which is discussed in section 3.4.5.168 The justification of an 
unequal treatment based on the balance allocation concept has its core element in the 
idea that the involved states have the right to allocate the tax base on territorial basis 
(i.e. unilaterally), or through negotiated DTC. Meaning that the framework for how 
taxes are balanced, as a result from the taxpayer activities, is already created by the 
Member States and therefore the taxpayer shall not be able to transfer the tax base at 
will between jurisdictions. Thereby limiting the taxpayer’s options of shifting profits 
to be taxed in low-tax jurisdictions and utilizing expenditures or losses in high-tax 
jurisdictions without being backed up by motivated economic transactions.169  
The CJEU case law on the applicability of this justification is rather unclear. 
Particularly, since the balance allocation concept as justification has been put 
forwarded to the court in a series of cases but seldom has it been accepted on a 
stand-alone basis.170 The CJEU applied this justification for the first time in the 
Marks & Spencer case coupled with the justifications tax avoidance and 
territoriality.171 In X Holding the court justified a restriction exclusively on the 
balance allocation concept with the same reasoning as in its previous case law except 
for the including of other justifications.172 What is evident from the courts 
jurisprudence with regards to the balance allocation concept as justification is that it 
will not accept such restrictions solely on the notion that resident and non residents 
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are not in a comparable situation without examining whether the legislation in hand 
is necessitated in order to protect the Member States exercise of taxing powers in 
relation to activities carried on in their territory and thereby preventing the taxpayer 
from choosing the outcome of the taxation within the involved states.173 Otherwise it 
would be free for States to treat residents and non-residents differently in all 
circumstances in the name of the balance allocation concept and thereby 
destabilizing the principles of the internal market. However, the CJEU has not been 
precise under what circumstances the balance allocation concept isolated from other 
justification could be applicable or accepted, since the court used the same reasoning 
in X Holding as in its previous case law where it was accepted in conjunction with 
others. Various authors have suggested and questioned whether the CJEU’s case law 
on the balance allocation of taxing powers is relevant on its own or whether it must 
be applied with other justifications in order to achieve it purpose of creating a 
symmetric taxation where the Member States territorial taxing rights are limited.174 
However, in Michael Lang investigation of the concept he makes a distinction on 
when the concept is relevant on its own and how it is to apply in conjunction with 
other justification grounds.175 He describes the possibility to apply the justification 
autonomous in relation to transfer of profits causing tax-deductible expenses at the 
will of the taxpayer and thereby undermining the balance allocation concept.176 A 
distinction made by Lang, which is important with regards to the Swedish rule, is 
that such rules at issue shall not be formed as anti-abuse legislation as that would 
automatically require the combination of justification grounds.177    
Both the European Commission and the Swedish government seem to agree that the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules could be justified with reference to the 
balance allocation of taxing powers in combination with the need to prevent tax 
avoidance.178 This will be examined in section 3.4.4, where the justification anti-
abuse is analysed. However, to determine whether the balance allocation concept 
alone could justify the Swedish rules is rather unclear. If one considers the overall 
assessment made by the CJEU in its case law one may say no, but then again, if the 
basis for the assessment is made upon the X Holding case the answer could be yes. 
After all, the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules does hinder affiliated 
companies to use debt as an instrument to shift profits to where ever they see fit and 
in what State the expenses shall be utilized, which is the objective of the balance 
allocation rule. However, to stop the examination here would not be correct. As both 
the AG Mengozzi and the court elaborated in the Argenta Spaarbank case one must 
seek to determine whether such granting of deduction would deprive the involved 
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states their territorial taxing rights.179 As Sweden has chosen to not levy any 
withholding tax on outbound interest payments in their negotiated DTC, they where 
never able to tax the outbound interest payment nor the income of a subsidiary 
located in another Member State. Neither does the granting of deduction by Sweden 
jeopardize the other countries possibilities to tax the subsidiaries located in its 
territory. This allocation of taxing power is the choice of the states involved and is 
not for the CJEU to intervene with.180 In addition, as Lang described the autonomous 
use of the balance allocation concept, the rules at issue shall not as in Sweden’s case 
target abusive practices. Therefore, in order for the balance allocation concept to be 
relied on by the Swedish government to protect its tax base it seems to be needed to 
be forwarded in combination with other justification. 
3.4.4 Anti-abuse 
As mentioned in previous section, tax restrictions made by Member States with the 
objective of combating abusive practices may serve as justification by imperative 
requirement of overriding public interest if it is proportionate.181 The anti-abuse 
principle created by the CJEU has a narrow field of application, as it only targets 
wholly artificial arrangements intended to circumvent national legislation, but also 
where such abusive or fraudulent conducts by the taxpayer results in exploitation of 
the provisions of the TFEU.182 Moreover, the CJEU has in its case law developed 
certain criterions in search for whether such arrangements exist.183 To begin with 
such structures are characterised by a tax advantage created by a cross-border 
activity, which the taxpayer would not have benefited from in a purely domestic 
setting.184 Moreover, restrictive national legislation could only be justified in 
circumstances where the aim of the rule is to systematically through objective and 
verifiable elements identify abusive or artificial arrangements not reflecting 
economic reality, thereby providing consideration of its objective.185 This means that 
national rules shall not categorically and generally disallow benefits in cross-border 
situation by assuming that all transaction is abusive. The rules shall allow the 
verifying of genuine commercial justification on a case-bay-case basis, without 
excessive administrative constrains put on the taxpayer.186  
However the argumentation by CJEU on the anti-abuse concept as justification for 
restrictive measures by Member States has been slightly different when it is 
considered together with the balance allocation concept. One difference that has 
been pointed out by several researchers is the level of artificiality required when it is 
considered combined with the balance allocation concept.187 It seems that the narrow 
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concept of wholly artificial arrangement has been broaden by the CJEU to include 
tax avoidance when it has ben justified in conjunction with the balance allocation 
concept.188 Raffaele Russo has reviewed the concept of tax avoidance, both from an 
international and EU aspect.189 Where the author discusses the tax avoidance concept 
as a spectrum containing legitimate and justified tax planning in one corner and 
wholly artificial arrangements at the other end, distant from each other by a grey 
area.190 This makes the courts reasoning as when to apply both the anti-abuse 
concept and balance allocation concept combined as justifications for restrictive 
national provision rather unclear. However, it seems that the CJEU accept these 
concepts in conjunction as justification where there might be a danger for the tax 
advantage to jeopardise the involved states to exercise the power to tax in relation to 
activities carried out in their territory, which would by manipulative and improper 
conducts risk the shifting of profits at will by the taxpayer within the involved 
states.191 
Whether the anti-abuse concept created by the CJEU could justify the Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rule on a stand-alone basis is questionable. Especially 
since the legislator has developed the rules as a SAAR intended to protect the 
Swedish tax base. As explained above, this means that the rule must exclusively 
target wholly artificial arrangements. However, the Swedish rules are formed in a 
manner that it categorically and generally disallows the benefit of deduction where 
the taxation of the interest income is taxed below 10%. Thereby, it systematically 
assumes that such transactions are wholly artificial. Even if the Swedish rule gives 
the taxpayer the opportunity to demonstrate that the engaged debt financing is not to 
receive a substantial tax benefit or whether it is mainly business motivated, when 
taxation is below 10%, the required thresholds are not inline with EU law. These 
thresholds are sett so high that sound tax planning, possible through tax differentials, 
encouraged by the CJEU would risk triggering the non-deductibility of interest 
expenses.192 The European Commission in its letter exchange with the Swedish 
Government has stressed this issue and whether the rules are proportionate. The 
proportionality test is an important factor when determining whether such rules 
could be justified and will be discussed under section 3.5.  
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However, the Swedish government is of the opinion that the Swedish rules could be 
justified by the need to safeguard the balance allocation of taxing powers combined 
with the anti-avoidance concept, arguing that the rules would not need to exclusively 
target wholly artificial arrangements under such circumstances.193 As explained 
above, this could be a valid argument when analysing the CJEU case law, however, 
it is far from certain if the court would agree that a symmetric taxation is achieved 
by the Swedish rules as it is rather unclear how the court applies this concepts 
combined.    
3.4.5 Cohesion of tax system 
The cohesion of the tax system as justification for a restrictive national measure 
affecting the equal treatment of nationals of the Member States was for the first time 
invoked by the CJEU in 1992.194 The concept of coherence is built on the assumption 
that there is a connection between the benefit that arises from a national provision 
and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy.195 This connection is 
recognised by the CJEU, as a “direct link” creating symmetry in the system of 
taxation which otherwise would be limited due to the Member States territorial 
limitation of taxing rights (micro coherence).196 The nature of that direct link must be 
tested in the light of the objective pursued by the tax rules.197 A Member State may 
not rely on the coherence concept as justification to deny an advantage, where the 
national rules allowed taxation in that state but where it through negotiated DTC 
allocated the taxing right to the other Member State.198 In such cases the CJEU has 
mentioned that Member States has to sort out the cohesion of the tax system through 
the means of bilateral tax conventions (macro coherence).199 Be that as it may, the 
establishment of the direct link seems to have slightly changed by the CJEU in its 
settled case law from its start in 1992 and as it stands today. In the courts early 
assessment on the coherence concept such direct link required a correlation of the tax 
advantage and the corresponding tax levy by relating to the same tax and applied to 
one and the same taxpayer.200 This requirement seemed to have been achieved if a 
close internal relation was found to exist between the advantage and the 
corresponding disadvantage.201  
To demonstrate an example on such internal relation, would be where an advantage 
is given in the form of loss relief in Member State A by losses incurred by a 
permanent establishment located in Member State B and where the offsetting of that 
advantage would appear by Member State A requiring the recapture of tax base 
when the permanent establishment makes profits in the following years. In contrast, 
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a domestic permanent establishment would not be required to recapture the utilized 
losses.202 The alteration seen in the assessment of whether a direct link exist in the 
CJEU later case law is that the close internal relation of the advantage and 
disadvantage seem to be satisfied where the link is not as close or direct as 
emphasised in earlier case law. In the K case a direct link was established between 
the deductibility of capital losses incurred in the sale of property in France and on 
previous or subsequent capital gains incurred by the sale of securities in Finland.203 
There is no connection in the loss making of the real estate and gains made through 
the securities. The court argues that in the Finnish and French DTC the allocation of 
the taxing rights hade been given to France and therefore the losses incurred by the 
Finnish resident could not be utilized in France or Finland.204 In addition the court 
also recognized the possibility of tax base erosion if such losses where to be 
accountable in Finland. Making it possible for the taxpayer to shift profits at will. 
The possibility of relying on the coherence concept in such situation is questionable. 
Since the Finish government has limited its taxing rights by exempting such incomes 
from France, the unilateral coherence of the Finnish system is broken. The court 
seems to emphasis the symmetric taxation and to be more willing to accept such link 
even when there is no close relation of the tax advantage and the tax levy when it 
considers the coherence concept combined with the balance allocation concept as 
justification.205  
Moreover, the required condition that the tax advantage and the disadvantage in form 
of tax levy have to relate to the same taxpayer has also been expanded by the CJEU 
depending on the aim of the rules involved. This was the case in Papillon, which 
regarded the French consolidation rules, where the court accepted that there was a 
link between the advantage and the offsetting of it when the rules concerned parent 
companies and its subsidiaries.206 Several researchers has recognised this broadening 
of the coherence scope made by CJEU in its case law. Wolfgang Schön explains the 
court actions as, “… hereby replacing in this one-sided approach the “direct link” 
between expenditure and income of an individual taxpayer with a “link” between 
certain types of expenditure and certain types of income arising from taxpayers 
cross-border activities in general”207. AG Kokott has also upheld this line of 
reasoning in her opinion in Manninen208 and Finanzamt Linz209. However, this does 
not mean that States could create a link between different items of expenditure and 
items creating profits at will or between different tax subjects. This is clear from the 
courts recent case law in Argenta Spaarbank, Nordea Bank and Finanzamt Linz 
where the CJEU found that such direct link does not exist when examining the 
objectives of the rules.210 
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Safeguarding the coherence of the Swedish tax system has not been brought up as a 
justification ground by the Swedish government. Whether this justification ground 
could have been relied on is unclear. In order to make this examination the criteria 
establishing a direct link explained above has to be analysed bearing in mind the aim 
and purpose of the Swedish rule. The required taxation of at least 10% of the interest 
income in the hands of the beneficial owner is established, as mentioned in section 
2.4, by a hypothetical test. It is tested whether the received interest income would be 
taxed by at least 10% according to the legislation of the Member State of the receiver 
and as if the receiver did not have any other income. By limiting the taxation to only 
the received interest income one could argue that the Swedish rule has established a 
direct casual nexus between the tax advantage at issue (deduction of interest 
expenses) and the resulting taxation of interest income. As the purpose of this 
justification ground is to avoid double taxation or to ensure that income is taxed 
once.211 By requiring such level of taxation the incentive to shift the profits to a low 
tax jurisdiction reduces. In Keller Holding however, no link was established between 
the deductibility of financial costs and the taxation of profits.212 As opposed to the 
Swedish rules the required taxation was not narrowed dawn to financial income.  
Moreover, in Argenta Spaarbank no direct link was established between the 
deductibility of risk capital and the required taxation of profits in Belgium.213 The 
CJEU states that there is no direct link “between the advantage calculated by taking 
account of the assets and the taxation of the return generated by them”214. In addition 
the court highlights that the Belgic rules requirement of taxation is directed towards 
all kinds of income incurred by the permanent establishment and thereby not income 
or profits created through the expenses of risk capital.215 In the author’s opinion, the 
rules at issue in Argenta Spaarbank is not comparable to the Swedish rules. As the 
Swedish rule separates the deductible costs so precise that these costs are earmarked 
and the same income or profit that is required to be taxed at the hands of the 
recipient. Therefore it could be argued that the Swedish rule create a direct link 
between the tax advantage and the offsetting of that advantage.   
However it is obvious that the benefit given (i.e. deduction of interest expenses) to 
the Swedish taxpayer and the required taxation are not in the hands of the same 
taxpayer. Be that as it may, as the purpose of the rule is to protect the Swedish tax 
base and the aim is to hinder affiliated companies to take advantage of abusive 
internal debt financing. Consequently, by aiming towards affiliated companies, the 
question that remains is whether there is a need for the rule to be directed towards 
the same taxpayer, as described above with regards to the Papillon case where the 
court accepted that it did not need to be the same taxpayer in order for the direct link 
to exist. On the other hand, in Bosal and Keller Holding the court did not accept that 
there was a direct link when the deduction and taxation did not concern the same 
taxpayer.216 However the three cases differ with regards to how the assessment of the 
direct link is established when considering the aim and purpose of the rules. In both 
Bosal and Keller Holding it seems like the court did not include the objective of the 
rules in its assessments of whether a direct link existed and only focused on the fact 
that the advantage and the offsetting of the advantage did not concerned the same 
taxpayer. In Bosal a direct link could be established between the advantage and the 
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disadvantage, the only thing that did not upheld that link was the fact that the court 
focused on whether they also were directed towards the same taxpayer.217  
Finally, the allocation of taxing power has not been shifted from Sweden to other 
Member States through bilateral treaties, as the profits from affiliated companies 
located in other Member States was never Sweden’s to tax in the first place. It could 
be argued that the Swedish rules might justify unequal treatment valid under the 
coherence concept combined with the need to safeguard the balance allocation of 
taxing power in order to sustain a symmetric application of the fiscal territorial 
principle.  
3.5 The Proportionality Principle 
Even if the Swedish rules where to be justified by overriding reasons of public 
interest described above. Such rules must comply with the principle of 
proportionality.218 In the case law of the CJEU it has been established four 
cumulative conditions that needs to be fulfilled in order to justify national measures 
which may hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty, the so-called Gebhard-test.219 The two first conditions are 
the examination of whether the rules applies in a non-discriminatory manner and if it 
could be justified by the imperative requirements in the general interest. The last two 
conditions are of importance for the assessment whether national measures could be 
considered proportionate.  National measures must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the pursued objective and they must not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to achieve the objective.220 This means that the court applies two tests to 
examine (i) whether the disputed legislation satisfies the intended objective and (ii) 
whether there are less restrictive measures available to achieve the same result.221 
The result of these two tests must lead to the determination of whether the rules are 
proportionate or not, there is no room for quasi-proportionate rules.222  
The European Commission has accused the Swedish rules for not being 
proportionate by the fact that they do not only target wholly artificial arrangements 
but also for putting heavy administrative constraints on the taxpayer.223 The latter 
emerges as the rules shifts the burden of proof exclusively on the taxpayer. The 
Commission also claims that the required thresholds inserted in the rules are vague 
and therefore difficult to demonstrate, adding additional constraints on the taxpayer 
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in assessing the taxable outcome of its activities. Consequently creating legal 
uncertainty for the taxpayer.224 It is clear that the rule do not solely target wholly 
artificial arrangements as the rule automatically assumes tax avoidance when the 
received interest income is taxed less the 10%. In such circumstances the Swedish 
rule requires the taxpayer to demonstrate that the debt financing is mainly business 
motivated, without the tax authority being required to provide even prima facie 
evidence of tax evasion or avoidance. In fact, as the investigation pursued by the 
Commission showed, all cases rendered to the Swedish Board of Advance Rulings 
where taxation was less then 22% such shift was made by the burden of proof to the 
taxpayer. In SIAT the CJEU states that it may be justified to request the taxpayer to 
provide information that clarifies that the transactions engaged is not abusive or 
artificial as it is inline with the objective of such SAAR.225 However, the court 
mentions that the Belgian rule is not proportionate because it demands the taxpayer 
to assess whether the receiving company in another country is taxed appreciably 
more advantageous then a Belgian company. To assess such threshold as appreciably 
more advantageous jeopardize the possibility for the taxpayer to determined the 
scope of the rules with sufficient precision and therefore placing the taxpayer in 
situation of legal uncertainty.226  
This was also the case in Itelcar227, where the CJEU did not approve rules placing 
the taxpayer in a situation where it cannot assess its taxable outcome. The court 
made it clear that, “rules which do not meet the requirements of the principle of legal 
certainty cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objective pursued”228. 
Similarly, the Swedish rule, by requiring the taxpayer to provide for a 75% 
commercially justified threshold seems excessive and problematic to measure due to 
the great deal of subjective assessment it would require. In addition such calculation 
made by a taxpayer when deciding the investment alternatives may not be perceived 
by the same way when assessed by the Tax Authorities, consequently creating legal 
uncertainty. Moreover the Swedish rule denies all interest expenses and not only that 
exceeding what would have been agreed at arm length’s, as demanded by the CJEU 
of rules intended to combat tax avoidance.229 Be that as it may, the objective of the 
emphasised rules in SIAT and Itelcar was to combat tax-avoidance (anti-avoidance 
concept). If the Swedish rules were to be tested under the justification of anti-
avoidance alone, the first step in the proportionality test would be achieved. As its 
objective to hinder abusive tax avoidance through debt financing is attained. 
Nevertheless, it would fail the second test. Since it goes beyond what is necessary to 
achieve its objectives. The rule could have been narrowed down to only target 
wholly artificial arrangements and not to be dependent on the level of taxation. 
However, the Swedish government has stressed that the rules are intended to 
safeguard the balance allocation of taxing powers combined with the anti-avoidance 
concept, therefore the examination of whether the rules achieve its objective must be 
done through this aim. As was demonstrated in section 3.4.4 the anti-abuse concept 
seems to be to some extent disregarded by the CJEU in its assessment of the 
justification ground when combined.230 Under these circumstances the rule achieves 
                                                      
224 Ibid, p. 8-9. 
225 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 53. 
226 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 57. 
227 C-282/12 Itelcar. 
228 C-282/12, Itelcar, para. 44; and C-318/10, SIAT, para. 59. 
229 C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, [2007] ECR I-02107, para. 
83; C-318/10, SIAT, para. 52; and C-282/12, Itelcar, para. 38. 
230 Hilling, M., Justifications and Proportionality: An Analysis of the ECJ’s Assessment of 
National Rules for the Prevention of Tax Avoidance, Intertax, 2013, Volume 41, Issue 5, 
Kluwer Law International, p. 300 (pp. 294-307); AG Kokotts opinion in Oy AA, [2007] ECR 
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its objective of hindering the taxpayer to shift the taxation of income at will by 
abusive debt financing. However, the question remains on whether the rule goes 
beyond what is necessary to obtain its objective. When both justification grounds are 
assessed combined it is not certain that the CJEU would perceive the rules as causing 
burdensome administrative constrains by demanding the taxpayer to clarifying 
taxation levels and motives for such transaction even if they are not artificial. None 
the less, the rules may still be regarded as creating legal uncertainty. The Swedish 
government has also pointed out in its defence that the taxpayer is in a better position 
to demonstrate the authenticity of its actions and that the CJEU have accepted the 
requirement of certain level of taxation in the hands of the receiver.231 Be that as it 
may, the rules contain several criteria that need to be fulfilled and all of them are 
difficult to assess with precision. This is also the reason why the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court has renounced the possibility for the taxpayer to apply for an 
advance ruling, arguing that the Swedish rules are not suitable because they require 
such extensive investigation and evidence from different parties.232 Whether the 
CJEU would consider the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules not 
proportionate and accept that the rule might not be sufficiently precise is however 
not clear. 
Even if the CJEU would accepts that the Swedish rules might justify unequal 
treatment valid under the coherence concept combined with the need to safeguard 
the balance allocation of taxing power in order to sustain a symmetric taxation it still 
must be ascertained whether the legislation goes beyond what is necessary in order 
to attain those objectives.233 As Sweden is not in a position to tax the profits or the 
interest income of the affiliated companies resident in other Member States the rules 
logic is to create certain conditions for when the interest expenses could be 
deductible without jeopardizing the Swedish tax base. By requiring certain level of 
taxation in the hands of the beneficial receiver the incentives to locate profits and 
debts at will between the involved states and not accordingly to where the activities 
are performed decreases.234 By this logic it could be said that the rules are justified as 
it attains its objective. However, as the Swedish rules do not explicitly mentions that 
it is intended to limit deductions only where there is a foreign affiliated company not 
taxable in Sweden but rather gives attention to combat tax avoidance through debt 
financing. The Swedish government needs to combine these two justifications 
grounds for restrictive national measures with the justification ground of anti-abuse 
in order for the rules to achieve its objectives. How national rules target its means 
may affect which justification ground is applicable as has been demonstrated above. 
Whether the court would recognize the Swedish rule to be proportionate by not 
going beyond what is necessary to achieve its objective and whether less restrictive 
measures could exist is still unclear as the rules may be perceived as not sufficiently 
precise.  
                                                                                                                                            
I‑6373, para. 62-63; C-337/08, X Holding, [2010] ECR I-01215, para. 71; and C-18/11, 
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231 In Sweden’s answer to the European Commission (dnr Fi2014/4205) they refer to C-
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232 HFD case no. 2674-14; and HFD case no. 4217-14. 
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234 Hey, J., Base Erosion and profit Shifting and Interest Expenditure, Bulletin for 
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4 Conclusions 
In order to fulfil the aim of the thesis three questions were asked. The first question 
was whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rule is discriminatory or 
restrictive. The analysis has showed that the Swedish rule treats resident and non-
residents in comparable situations unequal. The unequal treatment appears both as an 
indirect discrimination and a restriction, ultimately violating the freedom of 
establishment and under certain circumstances also the free movement of capital. 
The second question was whether such violation could be justified by the imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest. As the aim and purpose of the Swedish Interest 
deduction limitation rule is to prevent base erosion and tax avoidance through debt 
financing structures, the analyses has showed that the systematic logic of the 
Swedish rule cannot be justified by any of the overriding reasons in isolation. 
However, as the interest deduction limitation rules intend to reduce the incentives for 
deduction of interest expenses where Sweden’s territorial taxing rights over the 
corresponding interest income are limited when such transactions could be perceived 
as abusive. The Swedish governments options of justifying such rule exist in a 
combination of justification grounds. On the one hand, Sweden must defend the 
inner logic of its rule by arguing that the rule forms a symmetric logic of taxation, as 
protection of tax base as justification is not accepted and on the other hand the 
Swedish government must defend its rule as a SAAR. To justify discriminatory or 
restrictive national measures by reasons such as the necessity for a symmetric 
taxation can only be done by either one of the balance allocation concept and the 
coherence concept, or combined. However, the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rule does not only target wholly artificial arrangements, which is a requirement for 
SAAR set by the CJEU in order for the rules to be considered proportionate. When 
SAAR is combined with one or both justification grounds, which necessitate a 
symmetric taxation the CJEU has demonstrated that the rules could be considered 
proportionate even if it does not only target wholly artificial arrangements, which is 
the answer to the third question of this thesis.  
The results presented here are not conclusive on whether the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rule could justify unequal treatment in the light of the 
justification grounds. As it also could be argued that the Swedish governments claim 
of a symmetric taxation is not fulfilled. One might suggest that the Swedish rules go 
beyond the Swedish territorial taxing rights. As it demands a certain level of taxation 
in the hands of the receiver, which the Member State where the receiver is located is 
not demanding, nor has Sweden in its web of bilateral tax treaties tried to curb such 
transactions. The thesis has also showed that regardless of chosen justification 
grounds certain level of legal uncertainty is unavoidable. However, whether the 
CJEU would reject the Swedish rules only on aspects of legal uncertainty is not 
clear, although the fact that the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has rejected 
the possibilities to appeal the outcome from the Advance rulings indicates that the 
rules creates legal uncertainty. In the authors opinion the Swedish governments 
arguments could be accepted if the taxpayer could predict the outcome of its taxation 
through less burdensome ways. The coherence concept could also be added as 
justification ground if the court would accept a broader assessment of how to 
establish a direct link between the tax advantage given through the deduction and the 
offsetting of the advantage by a tax levy in line with the arguments forwarded by 
Juliane Kokott as mentioned above. Both the Swedish government and the European 
Commission have overlooked this justification ground as possible. The thesis has 
showed that the Commission could have also claimed that the Swedish rule infringes 
the free movement of capital and not only the freedom of establishment.     
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